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figures, of mental arithmetic, and of association of ideas. "The examination of a subject by means of these ten experimental series will show that it is possible to catch the attention at work, to seize its dynamic character. And theoretical conceptions will in so far be modified" (p. 61). It seems to the reviewer that some of the tests would require a great deal of psychological interpretation before they could be turned to account for the characterization of attention; at all events, the writers do not justify their statement. Chapter 3, on attention during sleep, reports an experimental study (made by Vaschide) of the ability to wake at a set time in the morning. Out of 40 chosen subjects, of different sex, age (20 to 76), occupation, education and nationality, 33 proved available for the test. The tendency was to wake too early; the amount of error, for 26 subjects, was in rough average 21 minutes; the error might, however, be as great as an hour and a half, and might reduce to 12 seconds. The chapter gives many interesting facts, objective and introspective, but offers no connected theory of the phenomenon. Ch. 4, on suggestibility and attention, reports Binet's experiments on the suggestibility of school-children (lines, weights), and concludes that, while there is no direct relation between suggestibility and attention, suggestibility may be considered as a state of emotive disturbance, the first effect of which is a disturbance of attention. Ch. 5, on hypnosis and attention, is mainly occupied with an account of Beaunis' well-known experiments. No theory of hypnosis is at present possible; it is, however, characterized rather by paraprosexia than by hyperprosexia, —that is, if the reviewer understands these terms, rather by diversion of attention than by extreme concentration of attention,—and by a high development of the 'forces of automatic attention.' Ch. 6 reviews and criticises the prevailing theories of attention, under the rubrics peripheral, motor, affective (Ribot, Bain), and sensory, voluntaristic, perceptive, central (Marillier, Kreibitz, Rageot, Nayrac). The authors conclude that attention is intimately related to emotion; that it is a phenomenon of central origin; and that it is essentially a dynamic function. "It is to the intellect what reflex irritability is to the nervous system; it is not a state, but an act." Let us hope that they find this conclusion satisfactory!—

As, now, we glance back over this series of books, we realize that, while they leave much to be desired on the score of systematic presentation, they are none the less readable and valuable, since every writer has some personal contribution to make to the existing stock of knowledge. A good part of the contents strikes the reader as perfunctory; but there is always some central chapter which brings new material or original ideas. Whether, under these circumstances, it is worth while to publish books rather than special articles is, perhaps, a question of taste; the reviewer, for his part, would prefer to dispense with the second-hand discussions.

The proof-reading is usually poor. The punctuation is erratic; the line-divisions show such monstrosities as *ins-upportable*, *o-bervation*; and names are massacred (Et. Slonon for E. E. Slosson, etc.).

JAMES FIELD

The World of Dreams, by HAVELOCK ELLIS. Boston & New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. pp. xii., 288. Price \$2.00 net.

There are at least four different ways, Mr. Ellis tells us, of writing a book on dreams. There is the literary method, which may be dismissed at once as wholly unscientific; there is the clinical method, followed for instance by de Sanctis in his *I Sogni*; there is the experimental method, of which Mourly Vold has recently given us an excellent example; and there is the introspective method, for a special form of which we are referred, rather curiously, to Freud's *Traumdeutung*. However, we need not split hairs about classification. The field of dreams is, in fact, the playground of all sorts of psychological opinion; the time has not yet come for anything like a final synthesis; and so long as an author appeals to actual observa-

tion, and so long as he takes up a definite position with regard to the phenomena observed, we may be grateful for what he gives us. Mr. Ellis has been noting down his dream-experiences for more than twenty years, and in the present volume throws the outcome of his studies into popular form. Let us see what his standpoint is.

Perhaps the first question that one asks of a writer upon dreams is that of his attitude to the Subconscious. There is, indeed, no question upon which the psychologists of this generation are more sharply divided; there is also no question which more imperatively demands a positive and clear-cut reply; either one explains the conscious by a subconscious which is still mental, or one draws the line of mind at the boundary of consciousness itself. Mr. Ellis seeks the middle way, where the faring is least secure. Consciousness is for him—as for the definers of the term in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*—‘the distinctive character of whatever may be called mental life.’ Subconscious is for the *Dictionary* ‘not clearly recognized in a present state of consciousness, yet entering into the development of subsequent states of consciousness,’—a definition that is obviously equivocal, and that is immediately particularized. Mr. Ellis cites it without comment, adding only that subconscious states are ‘slightly, partially, or imperfectly conscious,’ and that “any objection to so precise and convenient a term (!) seems to belong to the sphere of personal idiosyncrasy” (p. 4). What then does the term precisely mean? Consciousness covers, by definition, the whole of the mental life; is the subconscious not-mental? No: it is slightly, partially mental, or imperfectly mental. But, if it is the former, is the remaining ‘part’ of it material? Then, surely, our author’s objection to ‘dispositions of brain cells’ falls to the ground. Or, if it is the latter, can Mr. Ellis explain how a phenomenon may show ‘imperfectly’ the distinctive character that makes it what it is?

A second question, of a more topical nature, that the modern reader asks of a book on dreams is the question of the writer’s attitude towards the psychoanalytic school. And here again Mr. Ellis strikes a middle path which, to the reviewer, seems to lose itself in equivocation. “Freud’s subtle and searching analytic genius has greatly contributed to enlarge our knowledge of this world of sleep. We may recognize the value of his contribution to the psychology of dreams while refusing to accept a premature and narrow generalization” (pp. 174 f.). But is not this an attempt to eat one’s cake and have it too? We are to accept all the Freudian analyses, as holding for the dreams analyzed; but we are to reserve a large body of unanalyzed dreams, as belonging to ‘quite distinct’ types. Mr. Ellis disclaims in his Preface (p. vii.) any use of the psychoanalytic method; how, therefore, does he know that the unanalyzed dreams would not have submitted to a Freudian interpretation? And, in larger terms, how shall one gain the right to declare a generalization premature and narrow, save by producing negative instances within the universe of discourse to which the generalization belongs? The reviewer, be it noted, is not here arguing on behalf of Freud, as he was not arguing just now against any and every doctrine of the Subconscious; he is urging, simply, that unclear definition and dogmatic statement are out of place in science, however popular the form in which the scientific presentation may be cast.

What is the mechanism of dreaming? Mr. Ellis’ view is not easy to expound: partly because his own exposition is spread serially over a number of chapters, partly because he is by no means careful in expression. He inclines strongly to the opinion that all dreams are peripherally initiated; “we seem entitled to say that in all dreams there is probably a presentative element,” that every dream has “received an initial stimulus from some external or, at all events, peripheral source” (pp. 72 f.). The dream-consciousness is, therefore, always thrown into gear, so to say, by a peripheral stimulus, external or organic. When the gearing has been effected, movement may be kept up, even after the energy of the stimulus is exhausted,

by an inherent tendency of images to assert themselves in consciousness. A 'more or less spontaneous procession of images' is the elemental stuff of dreams (pp. 24 f.). In the most elementary form of dreaming, in which the peripheral element plays its largest part, we have a 'seemingly spontaneous,' 'mechanical flow of images, regulated by associations of resemblance' (p. 27). The stimulus, however, is never presented directly to consciousness, as it would be in the waking life, but "serves to arouse old memories and ideas which the dream consciousness accepts as a reasonable explanation of it" (p. 73). This circumstance would appear to determine the character of our dreams; and the author admits that the dream-consciousness may show "what we call a deliberate subconscious selection of imagery," so that a 'real subconscious link' connects any two successive images. Nevertheless, he insists that there may be sheer discontinuity; "mental imagery is deeper and more elemental than any of the higher psychic functions even when exerted subconsciously. Discontinuous images may arise from a psychic basis deeper than choice, their appearance being determined by their own dynamic condition at the moment." "If we hold to the belief that dreaming is based on a fundamental and elementary tendency to the formation of continuous or discontinuous images, which may or may not be controlled by psychic emotions and impulses, we shall be delivered from many hazardous speculations" (p. 24).

The passages are not clear. If the occurrence of the initial stimulus is universal, it is probably also necessary; yet, if images have a tendency to spontaneous irruption into consciousness, there is no reason why a dream should not be initiated at the centre; no reason, indeed, why we should cease from dreaming at all. Contrariwise, if the images are held together by associations of resemblance, then the initial stimulus, *plus* the law of association of ideas, is adequate to the result; the spontaneity of the images is illusory.

It seems that Mr. Ellis has found certain dreams which suggest a subconscious elaboration, and certain others which have a mechanical or disconnected look; he has accordingly called in, as explanatory principles, both the Subconscious and a dynamic *Bereitschaft* of images. His anti-physiological bias, leading him to emphasize the Subconscious and the Image as psychological terms, has then prevented the enquiry whether the 'dynamic condition' of the images is not an alternative to, or an equivalent of, the hypothesis of the Subconscious, and has also encouraged him to traverse the accepted doctrine of psychology that *Bereitschaft* is always strictly conditioned. This, at any rate, is the interpretation which the reviewer has put upon a puzzling subject.

The primary stimulus, we have learned, does not come to consciousness in its own right, but arouses old memories and ideas. The arousal, however, is again not direct. The stimulus, if it appeal to one of the higher senses, suggests motor activities which cannot be carried out; the excitation, entering motor channels, is impeded, broken up, scattered; and this process "is transmitted to the brain as a wave of emotion." If the stimulus is internal,—alimentary, cardiac, respiratory,—then the organic sensations which it sets up themselves constitute emotional excitement. While, therefore, the elemental stuff of dreams is a procession of images, "the fundamental source of our dream life may be said to be emotion" (p. 107). How does the stimulus, after its emotive transformation, arouse a dream? "The chief function of dreams is to supply adequate theories to account for the magnified emotional impulses which are borne in on sleeping consciousness. This is the key to imagination in dreams . . . Unable to detect the origin" of the emotive waves, sleeping consciousness "invents an explanation of them" (*ibid.*). This "craving for reasons is instinctive" (p. 8); "every dream is the outcome of this strenuous, wide-ranging instinct to reason" (p. 57); "all dreaming is a process of reasoning" (p. 56). Reasoning, however, is a "synthesis of images suggested by resemblance

and contiguity," and "the whole phenomenon of dreaming is really the same process of image formation, based on resemblance and contiguity" (p. 57). The possibility of subconscious elaboration is here given with the instinct to explain. But will not the hand of the instinct be forced, so to speak, time and again, by the inherent self-assertiveness of the images?

The reviewer has, perhaps, dwelt unduly upon obscurities which Mr. Ellis will, doubtless, be able to clear up. At the same time, the obscurities are here, a stumbling-block to the reader. And they appear again in connection with another question. What do we mean when we ask whether a particular conscious function or formation 'occurs' in dreaming? We may mean: Does it operate or appear as it does in the waking life? Is the mechanism of the dream consciousness, in its regard, to be considered as normal? Or we may mean: Do we ever dream of it as operating or appearing? Mr. Ellis is not careful to distinguish these two forms of the question. When he declares, for instance, that the attention of dreams is for the most part involuntary attention, he means, of course, that the general function of attention in dreams is of the same kind as the function of involuntary attention in waking; we are 'really' only involuntarily attentive, whatever we may dream ourselves to be. Since, however, he has just described two dreams in which the state of voluntary attention, as dream-phenomenon, is well marked (a dream in which a particular kind of postage stamp is looked for among the contents of a pocket-book, and a dream in which a particular hat is sought in a row of hats of all shapes and sizes), it would have been worth while to make the distinction explicit. Again, there is no doubt that many persons have, not infrequently, the dream-experience that they are dreaming. Mr. Ellis comments on the evidence as follows: "I have never detected in my own dreams any recognition that they are dreams. I may say, indeed, that I do not consider that such a thing is really possible" (p. 65). Truly, it is not 'really' possible to 'recognize' in dreams the dream-character of one's experience; for that, one must have waked. But just as in the waking life one may say, on the ground of specific conscious experience, 'I was thinking,' 'I was trying to remember,' 'I must have been dreaming,' so may one dream, specifically, that one is thinking, or trying to remember, or dreaming. To dream 'I am dreaming' is no more remarkable than to dream 'I am looking for stamps in a pocket-book.' Indeed, if the word 'occur' is taken in its second sense, there is no mode or item of waking experience that may not occur in the dream-consciousness: voluntary attention, deliberative thought, high resolve appear on equal terms with involuntary attention, overwhelming emotion, or the dream-state itself.

Mr. Ellis is not at his best in discussions of a technically psychological sort. On the other hand, his wide reading and practised fluency of writing stand him in good stead when he turns to special subjects. There is, *e. g.*, an interesting chapter on Aviation in Dreams. Mr. Ellis rejects Stanley Hall's theory of a hydro-psychosis, and explains the flying dream in the orthodox way (though he achieved orthodoxy unawares, by his own observations) as reflecting the rise and fall of respiration. It is odd that he has not thought of the possibility of a dendro-psychosis. If the falling dream suggested to one of Mr. Hutchinson's correspondents (*Dreams and their Meanings*, 1901, 108), the fear of falling from trees in sleep, the flying dream suggests no less definitely the swing of our arboreal ancestor, Mowgli-like, from tree to tree. This derivation would further account for the fact—a difficulty to Mr. Ellis—that the dream of flying is usually agreeable, the dream of falling usually disagreeable. The start from the sensations of breathing is not hereby denied; but on the writer's own principles some reason must be given for their imaginative dream-interpretation as the movement of flight.

Another chapter, on Dreams of the Dead, is based upon a paper published in the *Psychological Review* in 1895. At that date, Mr. Ellis could not,

of course, have read Mr. Kipling's wonderful story of *They*; but it might have been worth while, in the present recasting of his material, to raise explicitly the question whether 'one never sees a dead person's face in a dream.' The reviewer made some enquiry on this matter, in 1904, and found (in accordance with his own experience) that the dead face not uncommonly appears, as clearly and vividly as the face of a living person.

The chapter on Memory in Dreams contains a long excursus on false recognition or paramnesia. The author believes that the necessary preliminary to paramnesia is a general condition of temporary or chronic nervous fatigue, though no sense of exhaustion need be felt. An externally aroused perception begins, in this state, without sufficient strength to afford the realization that it is beginning; it is brought down to a lower and fainter stage, at which it is on a level with an internally aroused perception or memory-image; and when consciousness has become sufficiently developed to apprehend the nature of the perception, it also becomes aware that the experience has been continuing for an indefinite time (pp. 251, 258). "The mind has become flaccid and enfeebled; its loosened texture has, as it were, abnormally enlarged the meshes in which sensations are caught and sifted, so that they run through too easily. They are not properly *apperceived*. To use a crude simile, it is as though we poured water into a sieve. The impressions of the world which are actual sensations as they strike the relaxed psychic meshwork are instantaneously passed through to become memories, and we see them in both forms at the same moment, and are unable to distinguish one from the other" (p. 259). The difficulty in this hypothesis is that the 'actual present' reaches consciousness in the 'enfeebled shape' of a *memory*; for an enfeebled perception is not, *ipso facto*, an image of memory. Mr. Ellis has spared no pains to acquaint himself with previous attempts at explanation, but he has missed the ingenious analysis offered by Linwurzky in Meumann's *Archiv*.

OTTO PERLER